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Abstract: It has been argued by scholars that Indonesia can 
be a model of religious tolerance to the Muslim world. 
However, while a dramatic increase of intolerant acts 
against minorities in 2009-2012 across the country have 
challenged this argument, how the majority, to some 
extent, have also suffered due to similar actions by those 
who are not really representing the majority and how they 
respond to it has been almost completely ignored by all for 
a very long time. Cases in which Sumatran ‘traditionalist’ 
Malay Muslims have to abandon their own mosques in 
order to avoid disharmony potentials among themselves are 
significant examples. In this paper I present a valuable 
harmonious life in Jambi Malay Muslim community despite 
so many actions that can lead to conflicts. However, I also 
consider and contextualize the long-run implications of 
these responses, particularly regarding Muslim’s contens-
tation of Islamic public space and the problem of 
maintenance of a healthy democratic society.  
Keywords: Democratic-society, Malay-Muslim, religious-
conflicts, anti-bid’ah, public-space. 
Introduction  
This paper argues that although there is no question how 
important to uphold religious tolerance for the shake of a healthy 
                                                                 
1 This paper is a revised version of the paper presented at the ANU Seminar held on 
29 November 2012 and the 2nd Symposium of Southeast Asian Studies held by 
Oxford University, 9-10 March 2013.  
2 He thanks MC Rickelfs for his comments on the findings of his research that led to 
this paper; James J Fox for his lengthy comments of the draft; Greag Fealy for for 
discussing and giving very significant comments for the research findings that I 
included in this paper, and; Masdar Hilmy for his comments on the paper. Any error 
and mistake in this paper has nothing to do with the scholars mentioned above. 
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democratic society, tolerance could have its limitations. When a 
religious group deals with other religious groups that show potentials 
to an unhealthy democratic society, attitudes that show too much 
tolerant might not be best strategy. In addition, when members of 
religious groups are contesting in public spaces and only one group is 
allowed to be dominant with no sound ground, in the long run the 
tolerant groups might be suffered from unwanted consequences in 
which they feel being defeated because of their tolerance, rather than 
being viewed as valuable tolerant groups.3 Their voices just could not 
be heard appropriately, thus they chose to exit. This kind of temporary 
strategy of facing public space contestation might not be sugested for 
the seeds of a healthy democratic society. By making use of data 
collected from a field reasearch in 2011-2012, three questions that this 
paper attempts to answer are as follows. First how have Jambi Malay 
Muslims responded to the existance of neo “neo-anti-bid’ah” 
movement in Islamic public space?;4 Second, what kind of 
implication(s) do such response have in the the society, and; Third, 
how to contextualize such response for the sake of a healthy 
democratic society.  
Since the introduction of the famous and influential work of 
Jurgen Habermas in 1962, academic works on numerous fields - 
sociology, politics, communication, or religion, by applying public 
sphere theory (which has been applied interchangeably with public 
space) emerged.5 For example, Hoexter work on The Public Sphere in 
Muslim Societies,6 Lee Bernstein Gail, Andrew Gordon and Kate 
Wildmen Nakai who compiled Public spheres, private lives in modern Japan, 
1600-19507 and Sani who wrote The public sphere and media politics in 
                                                                 
3 A.O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and 
States (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970); F.G. Sanin, “Fragile 
Democracy and Schizophrenic Liberalism: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in the Andes,” 
International Political Science Review, 26, 1 (2005): pp. 125-139. 
4 I will come to a definition of what I mean by “neo anti bid’a” soon. 
5 Jurgen Habermas, Sara Lennox, and Frack Lennox, “The Public Sphere: An Encyclo-
pedia Article,” New German Critique (1974), pp. 49-55. 
6 M. Hoexter, The Public Sphere in Muslim Societies (New York: State University of New 
York Press, 2002). 
7 Gail Lee Bernstein, Andrew Gordon, and Kate Wildman Nakai, Public Spheres, Private 
Lives in Modern Japan, 1600-1950: Essays in Honor of Albert M. Craig (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Asia Center, 2005). 
  
Managing Islamic Public Space 
219 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 07, Number 02, December 2013 
Malaysia Newcastle upon Tyne.8 The latest work which focuses on public 
space and religion in general is the work edited by Silvio Ferrari and 
Sabrina Pastorelli Religion in public spaces: a European perspective.9 This 
literature is important to understand how members of society are being 
involved in public space and what kind of contribution they can give  
to a democratic society. 
In addition, there have been also a number of important works 
which particularly focus on its relation to contemporary Islam. Bowen, 
for example, writes Why the French Don't Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, 
and Public Space10, Abbink writes on Religion in Public Spaces: Emerging 
Muslim–Christian Polemics in Ethiopia and Reetz writes on public sphere in 
its relation to Islamic groups in India.11 In addition, there has been a work 
looking at how a group of a community responds to the presence of 
propagation movement which is not favored, that is through the work 
of Albert O. Hirschman, Voice, exit, and royalty: Responses to decline in 
firms, organizations and states.12 This approach is particularly useful when 
we analyze the reasons and implications of why certain individuals or 
groups of Muslims would choose to exit from their own mosques and 
to look for other spaces (mosques) to perform their prayers and other 
social and cultural acitivities as well as what implication this decision 
has to a healthy democratic society.  
While this literature lays important foundation to understand the 
function of mosques as Islamic public space, reaction and response of 
Muslims when they encounter differences or propagation from groups 
that are not favored by the majority in that place is not applicable to 
the question when a majority Muslim group encounter minorities and 
                                                                 
8 M.A. Sani, The Public Sphere and Media Politics in Malaysia (Newcastle: Cambridge 
Scholars, 2009). 
9 Pastorelli, Silvio Ferrari, and Sabrina, Religion in Public Spaces: A European Perspective 
(England: Ashgate Pub, 2012). 
10 J.R. Bowen, “Beyond Migration: Islam as a Transnational Public Space,” Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 30 (2004): pp. 879-894. 
11 See J. Abbink, “Religion in Public Spaces: Emerging Muslim–Christian polemics in 
Ethiopia” African Affairs, 110, 439 (2011): pp. 253-274; D. Reetz, Islam in the Public 
Sphere (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
12 See A.O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, 
Organizations, and States (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970); F.G. Sanin, 
“Fragile Democracy and Schizophrenic Liberalism, pp. 125-139. 
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would chose to abandon their own mosques instead for the sake of 
hormonious social life outside the mosques.  
It needs to be acknowlegded here that there have been abundant 
studies on Malay Muslims in general or Malay Muslims in Malaysia, but 
there has been so limited studies being conducted on Jambi Malay 
Muslims of Sumatra. In fact, outside Malaysia, Sumatra is the largest 
Malay community “Islam remains the most stabilizing, if not 
fundamental, element of the Malay identity’, … however, according to 
anti bid’ahh movement “there are aspects that need to be perfected or 
Islamized”.13 The worst is that there has been no study, to my 
knowledge, on how Jambi Malay Muslims manage Islamic public 
spaces particularly when they encounter their fellow Muslims who 
introduce different interpretations or practices of Islam against what 
they have been practicing along their life and ask them to change their 
old ways of practicing Islam. 
In this article, therefore, I intend to present a dynamic contestation 
between Jambi Malay Muslims and neo-anti bid’ah movement from an 
Islamic public space perspective and to show implications it has from 
the perspective of a healthy democratic society. I will begin my 
discussion by presenting a number of cases Jambi Malay groups 
respond to neo-anti bid’ahh movement in the region. Then, I will 
present the strategy of how Jambi Malay Muslims abandon their 
mosques for the sake of harmonious life which is arguably a pseudo 
healthy democratic society. After that, I will proceed with framework 
of the theory of public sphere from an Islamic perspective. Finally, in 
order to understand why there is contestation among Muslims over 
Islamic public space, I will present the roots of disagreement among 
Muslims particularly on the issue of neo-anti bid’ahh and analyse why 
Muslim scholars should deal with it for maintaining healthy democratic 
society. 
The Struggle of Jambi Malay Muslims for Social Harmonious 
Life  
In Jambi Malay Muslims, religious and ethnic identity is firmly 
fused. By origin, every Jambi Malay is a Muslim. Therefore, the original 
characters of Jambians such as tolerance of Jambi Malay Muslims 
towards immigrants from other regions and or religion follow this 
                                                                 
13 N. Saat, “Islamising Malayness: Ulama Discourse and Authority in Contemporary 
Malaysia,” Contemporary Islam, 6 (2012), p. 136. 
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Malay character. Cases of conflicts between newcomers and the 
‘indigenous’ Jambi as what happened in Lampung, Madura, Aceh, and 
other regions of Indonesia have never happened in Jambi. The latest 
census which includes ethnicity shows that the majority of Jambi 
population is Malay (38%), followed by Javanese (27%), the rest 
belong respectively to Kerinci, Minangkabau, Banjarese, Sundanese, 
Buginese and others.14 Originally, there is no Malay who embraces a 
religion other than Islam.15 Initial Islamisation of Jambi started 
significantly when Jambi sultanate was ruled by Rang Kayo Hitam, the 
King of the region, around the first decade of the 16th century. Thus, 
Islam was an identity of having connection with the kingdom. 
Whoever wanted to be identified with the kingdom, he or she should 
join the religion of the kingdom, that was Islam. The process took 
place peacefully without any confrontation with local religions or 
beliefs. There is no adequate evidence of confrontation which was 
caused by the introduction of the new religion. School of Islamic law 
which was then adopted by the sultan was Shafi’i. This then explains 
why this Islamic school of law rose and was embraced by every Malay 
Muslim even until today Jambi. After Islam has strengthened, the 
sultan used the Islamic honor which stated that his legitimacy was the 
legitimacy of religion. Meanwhile, along with the advent of colonialism, 
Islam became a source of strength in opposing colonialism.  
The harmonious life between Jambi Malay and newcomers 
relatively remained until the coming of Muhammadiyah (which came 
from Western Sumatra) in the late 1950s which created small 
psychological tensions.16 But the tensions did not last long since it 
slowly faded away after Jambi Muslim Malay tried to understand the 
                                                                 
14 The percentage of Javanese in Jambi increased dramatically in the middle of 1970s 
when Jambi became one of the regions that were made as target of transmigration 
program of Soeharto government of New Order. 
15 Judith A. Nagata, “What is the Malay?: Situational Selection of Ethnic Identity in a 
Plural Society,” American Ethnologist, 1, 2 (1974): pp. 331-350. For a comparison, 
Anthony Miller defines “Malay” today as a dual ethnic and religious identity does not 
something that comes on suddenly, but rather the result of social transformations that 
has taken place for centuries. See, Anthony Milner, The Malays (United Kingdom: 
Wiley- Blackwell, 2008), pp. 1-41. 
16 Muhammadiyah, founded in 1912, is one of the two largest Islamic organizations in 
Indonesia, the other is Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Both are symbols of moderate Islam in 
the country since the last two decades. Both are made as references whenever one is 
talking about religious life in the country. 
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difference between their Islamic practices and those of the 
Muhammadiyah. In most cases, Muhammadiyah followers built 
mosques of their own so that they could freely pass propagation of 
Islamic views and practices without concerning that they would have 
conflicts with Jambi Malay origins. The tensions were almost 
completely gone after the 1980s when Muhammadiyah started to 
promote more moderate way of their understanding and practice of 
Islam, known as cultural da’wa.17 Muhammadiyah promoted and 
implemented their religious beliefs and practices in their own places of 
worships, mosques and institutions of education. By this way, conflicts 
over Islamic shared places of worship had been gently avoided. While 
in their daily life there has been no issue that has made social 
disharmony among the newcomers and Jambi Malay Muslims. This is 
due to the fact that most of the newcomers were traders from West 
Sumatra that once was in the same province of Central Sumatra with 
Jambi. As can be seen when Islamic space is managed in a well 
manner, then, there is no significant conflict that can drive people’s 
concern. 
However, after the collapse of New Order government and the 
Reform Era took place, since 1998, this harmonious life among Jambi 
Muslims as in many cases in other parts of Indonesia, the Islamic 
Malay indigenous and the newcomers faced a new problem with the 
emerging of neo-anti bid’ah movement which took over what 
Muhammadiyah used to actively work on.  
It has been observed that there are a number of different groups 
which have similar goals, propagation of neo-anti bid’ah, but this paper 
focuses specifically on one family which has significant impact on the 
issue of neo-anti bid’ah particularly during the period of the study 
focused on and how Jambi Malay Muslims responded to it. Unlike the 
way Muhammadiyah used to do, which used the mosques of their own, 
this family made mosques which belong to traditional Islam for the 
purpose of propagating their Islamic views and practices. 
                                                                 
17 Muhammadiyah reaffirmed her more moderate approach in dakwah activities, known 
as cultural dakwah in the mid of 1980s when her moderate leaders did every effort, 
such as publishing books. For more details on this, see Suaidi Asyari, Traditionalist v.s. 
Modernist Islam in Indonesian Politics: Muhammadiyah & Nahdlatul Ulama in the Contemporary 
Indonesian Democratic and Political Landscape (Germany: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2010), 
particularly chapter IV where the author discusses Muhammadiyah metamorphosis. 
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In early 2000s, KH Abdurrahman Yusuf, an imam (preacher) sent 
his son to study Hadith at the University of Ummul Qura in Madina.18 
Abdurrahman Yusuf lived in Jambi city. His name is one of the two 
names listed under Ustadz-ustadz penyebar Wahabi di Indonesia (Lecturers 
who propagate Wahabism in Indonesia); the other is Ustadz Banani 
who also lived in Jambi city.19 Abdurrahman Yusuf has never clearly 
stated that he was propagating Salafism or Wahabism. The term that 
he kept referring to when explaining certain riatulas of Muslims that he 
was attacking, was bid’ah. Yusuf is not officially associated with any 
institution of Muhammadiyah or else, such as pesantren, business 
networks, and others. He was only one of the teachers of pengajian 
(Islamic gathering) which was held in mosques where Islamic rituals 
accord with Nahdlatul Ulama. 
As for any other teachers, Yusuf had daily schedule to give 
sermons in a number of mosques in Jambi city. This was actually part 
of his job since he had no other job but doing da’wa (preaching Islamic 
messages). Earlier on, he was very well accepted by Jambi Malay 
Muslims since he had traditionalist practices of Islam, of the Nahdlatul 
Ulama. However, in early 2000s, Abdurrahman Yusuf received a 
number of copies of books from his son from Madina who came back 
for a break to Jambi when his son brought along with them a number 
of books. Abdurrahman Yusuf has never mentioned the title of the 
book neither he brought the books to his pengajian but only stated that 
he had left what he used to practice as far Islamic practices were 
concerned. At one point, Abdurrahman Yusuf introduced what he had 
heard from his son to his younger brother, Abdurrahim Yusuf, who 
also had the same profession as his, giving da’wa from one mosque to 
another. Since then, Abdurrahim Yusuf did the same thing to his older 
brother, Abdurrahman Yusuf, promoting anti bid’ah.  
Although in the list of of Daftar Ustadz-Ustadz Penyebar Wahabi Di 
Indonesia, posted at official site of Ummul Qura Pesantran (Islamic 
boarding school) in Jakarta, KH Abdurrahman’s name is one of the 
listed names, it can hardly be heard that he is promoting Wahabi or 
Salafi ideals explitcitly.20 All he kept repeating that he was concerned 
                                                                 
18 For the purpose of ethics of the study, all the names in this study have been kept 
anonymous. 
19 Administrator. Daftar-ustadzustadz-penyebar-wahabi-di-indonesia. Retrieved 10 02, 2012, 
from Ummul Qura Boarding School: http://www.ummulqura.sch.id/ 
20 Ibid. 
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by bid’ahh activities of Jambi Malay Muslims since he was introduced 
by his son by sending him books on this matter. The way he promotes 
what he believes to be the correct practices of Islam can hardly be 
labelled as Salafism or Wahhabism, but anti bid’ah. 
There are four strategies of how Jambi Malay Muslims responded 
to such attacks from neo-anti bid’ah movement vis-à-vis their tolerant 
nature. The very significant response was that they would maintain 
their harmonious social life although with the cost of abandoning their 
own mosques when they faced conflicts against other aggressive 
groups of Muslims such as the neo-anti bid’ah movement. This is 
particularly true when they are in smaller Islamic places of worships 
such as mushalla, langgar, surau or in big mosques where the religious 
activities are organized by more tolerant organizers (mosque ta’mir).21 
Thus, it is not unusual that many Muslims who have to walk, ride 
motorcycles or drive their cars to pray while there are mosques closer 
to their houses but they do not feel comfortable to pray in. 
Although not all the six mosques being observed for this study 
support this generalization, from cases of mosques that lead to this 
generalization it can be argued that there might be similar cases in 
other places where Muslims would respond the same.  
The first example of this is in Al-Fityah Mosque in Telanaipura 
Jambi. This mosque was relatively newly built, in late 1970s, when the 
neighborhood was just occupied by the earliest inhabitants of the area. 
However, since it is situated just accross the street from the campus I 
of IAIN STS Jambi, most of those who perform prayers in the mosque 
are students, lecturers, more or less educated Muslims. Since the 
mosque was built up to early 2000s, Islamic rituals and cultural 
activities which were conducted in or associated with the mosque have 
followed the Indonesian traditional Islam, as in most mosques in 
Jambi, such as dhikr, qunut, youth activities, and others. In the mosque 
                                                                 
21 Within Indonesian Muslims, Islamic public places of prayers are named as masjid, 
mushalla, langgar or surau. All are places for Muslim prayers, thus they all mean 
“mosque” in English word. But they have other different architectural styles and 
functions. While masjid generally have minarets, mihrab, mimbar, all other places of 
Muslim prayers (mushalla, langgar, or surau) do not. Mushalla, langgar, or surau are mostly 
built by Muslims whenever a mosque is not available in certain areas or not easily 
reached both due to far distance or other circumstances such as security reasons. 
Therefore, on the one hand, mushalla, langgar, or surau mostly limited to function as 
places for performing daily prayers (shalat maktubah), masjid on the other hand also 
function as place for Jum’at congregation as well as for other social gatherings. 
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were also organized regular and organized collective gatherings for 
tahlilan (collective dhikr) where the chief of the neighbourhood (Ketua 
Rukun Tetangga) make use of it to deliver information both from the 
government and other social issues of communities in the surrounding 
areas. These gatherings were mostly attended by senior inhabitants and 
students who lived around the mosque. There were around 40 
participants who attended such activities regularly.  
There were and still are usually students who lived in a room 
attached to the mushalla for free. These students have responsibilities 
to clean the mushalla and recite adzan (calling for prayers) for every 
prayer, particularly subh, maghrib and isya prayers and during Ramadhan 
every year. They also taught children who lived around the mosque 
how to recite the Qur’an and basic knowledge of Islam such as how to 
perform prayers and as such. They also arganized other activities of 
youth who live around the mosque, such as reading barzanji and 
others. Senior female inhabitants also had their own activities in the 
mosque such as monthly religious discussions where they also used for 
other social meetings. There were five imams who usually alternately 
lead daily prayers in the mosque before the present situation. Three of 
the imams were senior lecturers of IAIN STS Jambi and the other two 
were graduate from IAIN but worked at other local government 
offices.  
Every thing went smoothly and regularly in the mushalla until first 
day of Ramadan 2004 when one of the imams proclaimed that he 
regreted to have performed Islamic rituals as what he had done along 
his life. He had been taught that all what he had done were bid’ah 
which made him deserved to be sent to hell fire. He urged all of 
jama’ah (congregation participants) in the mosque should also regret 
and follow his path to leave what they had been practicing. He said 
that he had left the traditional ways of performing Islamic rituals.  
All the jama’ah who were in the mosque were shocked, silent and 
refrain for sometime until one of the imams in the mosque at that time 
stood up and made a counter statement. This imam said that no one of 
them had to obey what had been stated by the other imam. Since then, 
there has been uncertainty who should organize religious and Islamic 
social and cultural activities which use to be organized from the 
mosque up until this study was conducted. Until one year later 2005-6, 
there were arguments took place whenever the imam about to lead 
prayers. Whenever Abdurrahim Yusuf was in the mosque, he usually, if 
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not always, managed to be the leader of every prayer. Every time he 
made any effort that he would be leading the prayers. He kept pointing 
out that whatever action that did not follow his ways was bid’ah. He 
would not start leading prayers until every one followed what he asked 
to do. Those who did want to be involved in arguments or conflict 
would choose to leave the mosque or perform prayers separately and 
individually in the mosque.  
Almost all activities other than regular prayers, such as cultural 
activitiesof celebrating the birth day of the Prophet, Islamic New Year, 
isra’ and mi’raj, and others had also to be stopped. Women activities 
had to be moved to their houses alternately. The worst thing is that the 
monthly gatherings of tahlilan where the chief of the neighborhood 
(Ketua Rukun Tetangga) could usually pass on information to the 
members of the negibourhood both from the government and other 
social activities had also to be stopped on the ground as containing 
bid’ahh elements.  
Since late 2007s onward, all other imams and one by one of 
jama’ah participants had chosen to go to other places of prayers 
around the area with the reason that it is better to go to other places 
rather than having conflicts all the times. Strong arguments or word 
wars for them can lead to fights which are not good for their 
community. Some others chose to perform their prayers in their 
houses with similar reasons. Conversation on the issues of Islamic 
rituals or related to other Islamic issues among the people of the 
neighborhood were hardly heard. During the time of this study took 
place, there were only around seven students who become the jama’ah 
but no one of the neighborhood residents. When they were 
interviewed, the students told the researchers that they had no other 
choice because they stayed in the mosque for free. Whenever they 
went back to their villages, they continued, they would perform their 
prayers as they used to do. They do not want to make the imam upset 
or to leave the mosque.  
However, there are a number of previous students who choose to 
leave the Al-Fityah mosque and went to other mosques where they 
could stay in for free. This was off course unfortunate for other 
students who had to pay a rent house as most students would have to 
do if they could not help themselves to stay in the mosque with such 
situation all the times.  
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In 2009, around two weeks before the first day of Ramadan when 
Muslims started to fast, the Chief of the neighbourhood (Ketua Rukun 
Tetangga) invited all the imams and seniors of the neighbourhood to 
have a meeting to solve their poblems. All the participants agreed to 
maintain harmonious life among them despite having different ways of 
practicing particular Islamic rituals. Thus, it was decided that those 
who had left the mosque could cunduct their Taraweh prayers in the 
mosque with alternate imam without including the imam who 
promoted the anti bid’ahh. The imam promised that while he would 
not join the Taraweh prayers, he could still perform and become the 
imam for the daily prayers other than the Taraweh prayers. This is 
what the rest of Muslims agreed to do up until the present study was 
conducted. This, however, had not help many to go back to the 
mosque for performing prayers other than tarweh prayer. 
Data from Al-Ulya mosque Buluran Kenali Jambi tell us similar 
story. There used to be similar activities mentioned above but it used 
to have more than one hundred active participants of pengajian. Al-Ulya 
was built in early 1950s where the initial Malay Muslims who lived 
there those who were born in the area and claimed to be as penduduk 
asli (original inhabitants) as oppose to pendatang (new comers). Since it 
was built there were religious and social activities that were conducted 
in or initiated from the mosque. In 2003, it started to have bigger and 
regular pengajian  with a regular preacher, KH Mas’ud who lived in the 
area. This was to follow the trends in Jambi in general during that time 
after the collapse of New Order regime. However, after KH Mas’ud 
passed away he was replaced by Abdurrahman Yusuf, the propagator 
of anti bid’ahh. After one year or so, he proclaimed that he had left his 
wrong way of performing Islamic rituals in front of participants of 
pengajian. All participants of his pengajian (Religious Study Group) 
were shock including the two initiators and organizers of the 
pengajian, Abdul Rauf Syafi’i and his wife, Siti Solehah. After that day, 
one by one of the pengajian participants left the pengajian and some of 
them even left the congregation prayers too to be done at their houses. 
Until one day, there were only two participant of the pengajian left, the 
organizers. All other activities joined to the pengajian were also 
ultimately stopped. Finally, the organizers openly recommended the 
imam to discontinue the pangajian. Only a few months before this 
study took place, small activities started again but there were still very 
few who joined. 
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However, in Raudhoh mosque which is located in Telanaipura, 
tradtional Muslims can well maintain what the jama’ah had been doing, 
the imam and organizers of the mosque were all from senior of 
Nahdlatul Ulama. They had never let the propagotor of neo-anti bid’ah 
to become imam and neither to lead regular prayers. When they were 
interviewed, they clearly stated that if you allowed people like them 
(the neo-anti bid’ahh propagators) to lead us, they will never be able to 
get thier mosque back. So, they never let any rituals to be led by any 
imam of neo-anti bid’ah movement. 
Similarly, the mosque of Al-Jami’ah, which experienced to recieve 
a number of callings from the imam of Al-Fityah mosque to stop what 
they had been practicing, maintained their activities. Next to the 
mosque of Al-Jami’ah, there is a Ma’had Aly, a university boarding 
school of IAIN STS Jambi. Both male and female students organized 
relgious, academic and social activities in the mosque, such as 
discussion, reading kitab kuning (lit. yellow books) and training for 
becoming Islamic preachers, da’i. These students organized regular 
religious chantings before and after daily prayers by using load speaker. 
They are clearly heard from Al-Fityah mosque. As reported by the 
students and a number of lecturers of the Al-Jami’ah mosque, the 
imam of Al-Fityah had come to Al-Jami’ah mosque a number of times 
to ask them to stop doing what the imam had heard. Until, one day, 
the student stated that they would not stop what they were doing 
whatever the imam had asked them to do.  
A differnt story came from Nurdin Hasanah mosque. In here, the 
neo-anti bid’ahh activists were allowed to have their own pengajian  from 
which their activists kept inviting other jama’ah of the mosque to join. 
However, the neo-anti bid’ahh activists had never joined other groups 
of pengajian  although they were encouraged to do so by the 
organizers of the mosque. Almost in every two days, there are pengajian  
by both neo-anti bid’ahh and the other Muslims. 
Agung Al-Falah mosque (recently known as a mosque of 1000 
pillars) shows similar experience of Al-Raudhah mosque. Although 
there were some experiences where neo-anti bid’ah activists intended to 
propagate their mission, there was no story that tell us they have even 
had a chance to do so. This is because the mosque is organized by 
officials from the governor office, including the Vice Governor, 
Fachrori Umar. Despite Fachrori Umar seems to be tolerant, but when 
it comes to such issue of anti bid’ahh, particularly the way it is 
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introduced, he would show his reluctance to open a space for that 
matter. Although there have been attempts by various groups to 
introduce different ways of practicing Islamic prayers, Agung Al-Falah 
mosque remains as it is since it was built. For example, whenever there 
is a visit from a ministery from Jakarta, the organizers of the mosque 
would just inform how Islamic rituals are usually performed there. 
Thus, there has never been heard any arguments or conflicts among 
the participants (jama’ah) who go to the mosque. Therefore, 
government interferences seem to be able to maintain the harmonious 
life both within mosque and outside it. This is of course to suggest that 
every Muslim who prefers different ways of performing Islamic ritual 
has to go to other mosques or to build their own mosques. However, 
this strategy also shows that mosque as public space does not function 
as it is supposed to.  
To sum up, the above presentation shows that there are three main 
strategies of how Jambi Malay Muslims responded to the propagation 
of neo-anti bid’ah in Jambi. Firstly is to save their tolerant nature of 
Jambi Malay against religious interest. This is the most significant 
strategy bacuase they have to abandon their own mosques for the sake 
of social harmonious life outside the mosques. They still live together 
and do social activities together outside the mosque. This happens 
when those who are the propagators of neo-anti bid’ah also live in the 
same area and the imam has also been indoctrinated by anti bid’ah 
teachings. However, when they are asked in more details how they feel 
after they had to move from their own mosque, they showed that they 
did not feel comfortable to live outside the mosque if they had to have 
fights or disagreements all the time. However, those who were neo-
anti bid’ah did not feel bothered by the loneliness of the mosque. At 
this point one would question 'so what is the point of conducting 
dakwah' if the result is to make people leaving them. The very essential 
purpose of dakwah is to persuade others to following but not to 
leaving.  
The second most serious reaction is by stopping religious activities 
of the mosques where religious activities such as pengajian  was used to 
be taught by the same interpretation and practices of imam, but the 
imam does not live in the same area of the mosques. So when the 
imam proclaimed that he had converted to different ways of practicing 
Islamc rituals, they would temporarily stop their religious activities in 
the mosques until they are settled and have opportunities to start again 
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their activities with different imams or preachers. The imams had to 
leave the mosque and looked other mosques to continue their 
propagation of anti bid’ah. This is more or less a strategy of zero-sum 
game.22  
The third strategy is a comparatively win-win solution. This 
strategy shows that both neo-anti bid’ah movement and the organizers 
of activities in particular mosques chose to others to perform Islamic 
rituals on their own ways so long as they do not disturb other Muslims. 
They chose to share space in the mosque. However, in the long run, 
Muslims who chose this strategy might be just waiting an opportunity 
to expel those who are different from them or might also be ending 
with arguments or conflicts to each other.  
This study shows that Jambi Malay Muslims did not really matter 
with the beliefs and practices of those who were different from theirs. 
This is in line with the nature of Jambi Malay Muslims who welcome 
newcomers to the region be they from the same religion or not or be 
they from the same ethnicity or not. Every new comer to the region 
has been welcome. Their objection, however, on the way these 
deferent practices were introduced, propagated, or even forced to 
them. In addition, not only have they practiced their old knowledge of 
Islam since they were children, but the way the different practice being 
introduced to them put them as if they were elementary school 
students as those who were interviewed told their stories to the 
researchers. This is not to mention that they also have their foundation 
and argument to practice what they have been practicing. They avoid 
to having arguments just because the place and time to have such 
arguments is not appropriate to them, particularly when prayers is 
about to start.  
Claims of Bid’ah: Source of Endless Tensions 
Both from theological and historical perspectives, there are three 
significant roots of dynamic of thought in Islam as well as in many 
cases that have led to unavoidable disagreements, tensions, conflicts or 
even fights among Islamic societies until today in the Muslim world, 
wherever they are; bid’ah, ijtihad23, and the notion of “saved sect” of 
                                                                 
22 See John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstren, Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953). 
23 Ijtihad can be defined as to exert one’s utmost independent effort in interpreting the 
Qur’an and Hadith of the Prophet Muhammad in order to arrive at the closest what is 
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Islam (firqah al-najiyyah).24 All these three are rooted from three 
different hadiths of the Prophet Muhammad and all are among the 
most controversial issues regarding the root causes of disagreements 
among Muslims along their history. The only difference is how they 
are taught about the roots, in what kind of neighborhoods they grow 
up and how they react to the roots in cases they have different 
interpretation to one being introduced. As far as neo-bid’ah is 
concerned, the very root of conflicts and disagreements refers to the 
most referred oral tradition (Hadith) of the Prophet Muhammad 
regarding specifically to illigitimate innovation (bid’ah) as follows: 
                                                                                                                                      
considered to be definitive judgment so that the messages of the two references can be 
applied empirically and contextually (whenever and wherever Muslim community live). 
So every single problem faced by Muslims should be responded by a mujtahid (an 
independent Muslim scholar) when there is no (clear, direct) answer from either the 
Qur'an or Hadith. There are a number of important points that make Muslims having 
disagreements on ijtihad. Among others are those who have the authority to conduct 
ijtihad, whether ijtihad can be conducted both in theological and legal field, whether it 
can be conducted by men only or women can also do the same, whether the door to 
conduct it has been closed in a certain period of Islamic history or it is always open, 
whether ijtihad can be done collectively or it has to be done individually, and if there 
are prerequisites to do so, what happens to those who cannot meet the prerequisite, if 
they just practice Islam as a muqallid (blind follower), namely to follow what an 
authoritative mujtahid rules and so forth. These are only among roots of disagreements 
among Muslims which basically no one can avoid. For more details, see T.J. Al-Alwani, 
“Ijtihad and Taqlid”. The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 8 (1991): pp. 129-142; 
A. Albarghouthi, “Authority and representation in North America: the Ijtihad Criteria 
and the Construction of New Religious Authority,” Journal of Islamic Law and Culture, 13 
(2011): pp. 18-33; A. Hasan, “An Introduction to Collective Ijtihad (Ijtihad Jama‘i): 
Concept and Applications,” The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 20 (2003): pp. 
26-46; T. Ramadan, Title is Radical Reform, Radical Ijtihad (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008); A. Dankowitz, “Accusing Muslim Intellectuals of Apostasy,” The Middle 
East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) (2005), pp. 1-6.   
24 The question who is the saved sect in Islam is rooted from what is famously called 
as the seventy three sects Hadith about Muslim divisions after the Prophet. The 
Hadith states as follows: “The people of the book before were split up into seventy 
two sects, and this community (Muslim) will be split up into seventy three. Seventy 
two of them will go to Hell, and one of them will go to Paradise..”. In interpreting who 
is “the one” that will go to Paradise is subject to debates up until this modern era of 
Muslim community. Every group or interpretation claims to be the saved sect that will 
go to Paradise. Ideally, debates on this issue of the saved sect will make Islam very 
dynamic. However, there are times and cases that lead to strong arguments and fights 
among Muslims.  
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Verily, the best speech is the Book of Allah and the best 
guidance is the guidance of Muhammad ibnu ‘Abd Allah 
(Saw). The worst of all affairs in this religion are 
innovations. Every innovation is a bid’ah and every bid’ah is a 
going astray and every going astray is in the hell fire. 
Since the period of the four caliphs of Islam, the first century of 
Islamic calendar, Muslims had actually divided into two streams 
regarding what was categorized as bid’ah. While one group is in the 
position that there is only one bid’ah, that is dhalalah or misguidance, 
the other group is in the position that there are two kinds of bid’ah; 
bid’ah dhalalah and bid’ah hasanah. For the second position, within the 
second bid’ah there are also five other consecutive rulings, jaiz 
(allowable), mustahab (commendable), makruh (detestable), wajib 
(obligatory) and haram (forbidden). Among what are famously included 
in the bid’ah dhalalah for the first position as follows:  
Conversing the intention for worship (niyyat) in Arabic 
words, in addition to what is stated in mind. 
Reciting bismillahirrahmanirrahim whenever one starts to recite 
verses of the Qur’an from the first verse (ayah) of each 
Surah during prayer. 
Reciting qunut du’a in the last raka’ah of subh (dawn) prayer. 
Reciting collective dzikr and du’a after each collective prayer. 
Reciting talqin (du’a) and qur’anic recitation/chanting for the 
deceased in grave. 
Reciting Surah Fatihah (the first chapter of Qur’an) in times 
of celebration or death. 
Mawlid: Celebrating the birth of Prophet Muhammad (12th 
day of Rabi' al-Awwal in the Hijra Calendar). 
Celebrating Islamic New year of Hijrah. 
Conducting weekly and monthly gatherings where certain 
du’a, dzikr (remembering God), and certain surah of the 
Qur’an are recited.  
Offering meals for guests who invited to recite du’a for the 
death. 
Offering Qur’an recitations or other chanting in 
congregation. 
Hiring people to recite the Qur'an at the time of someone’s 
death. 
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Celebrating ascension of Prophet (Israa wa Al-Miraj) and 
Hijrah (Prophet’s migration to Mecca). 
Mourning the martyrs of Badr on the 17th day of Ramadan. 
Mourning the martyrdom of Hussain and his family on 
Muharram. 
Major Bid’ah include building monuments on graves, making 
graves as mosques, and visiting graves for blessings. 
And there are some other activities which are less prequent 
causes of disputes among Muslims but are also considered 
to be bid’ah. 
As can be seen that the seventeen activities above can take place in 
mosques and outside mosques. From these, there are a number of 
important issues that have most commonly caused disagreements or 
even conflicts between the anti bid’ah movement and other Muslims in 
a mosque when starting obligatory prayers, during performing prayers, 
and performing certain recitations or chanting after each prayer. These 
points are the most important focus of the paper because they are 
intriguing factors that lead to issues of intolerance. Therefore, they 
deserve to be treated in some further details. It has to be emphasized 
that for those who do not follow the same way of practices, as this 
study also proves, the core problem does not lie in the differences but 
the intolerant way of the anti bid’ah movement in promoting the 
‘purist’ practices against different practices of others.  
In addtion to the bid’ahh, the initial and the very core foundation 
of the problem is methodology of the saved sect (firqah al-najiyyah) in 
putting their beliefs into practice,. Many of those who consider 
themselves to be the saved sects need to have responsibility to save the 
rest of their fellow Muslims. Those who consider themselves to be the 
saved sect but do not feel responsible to save the rest will be 
condemned by God. Those who feel responsible to save the rest by 
means of tolerant and acceptable ways, such as discussions, are not 
around during the time prayers to be performed. Those who feel 
responsible to save the rest by means of intolerant, be they are their 
own mosques or in other mosques, are always there during the time 
prayers. Hence, this kind of disagreement will never end. 
In most previous studies, these all have been connected to the 
background of Wahabism and Salafism. But this study is an attempt to 
look at the topic from a different perpective. If there are political 
aspects to be touched, it is only for the purpose to help us understand 
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the focus of the study but not being core part of the discussion. In 
addition, Wahabism in the field of Islamic studies until two decades 
ago or so was regarded as part of Islamic reform. Even the act of Ibnu 
Saud which was supported by Wahabism in destroying sacred places of 
Islam in the second decade of the 1900s was ignored or even regarded 
as part of modernization process.  
However, Wahabism has been lately put into the study of radical 
Islam or worst, terorism. For example Schwartz’s, with his Two Faces of 
Islam, asserts that Muhammad Ibn Abd Wahab is “the first known 
exemplar of totalitarianism” which of course does not fit into a 
modernist category.25 Rashid with his Militant Islam strongly argues that 
Wahabism has had inspired the contemporary jihadist movement.26 It 
has to be aknowledged, however, that the philosophical and 
theological roots of anti bid’ah are necessary to be briefly dicussed 
where pheriperial aspect of Wahhabism and Salafism is unavoidable to 
be touched.  
Academically, studies on anti bid’ah movement has been better 
known as salafi movement. However, for the purpose of this paper, I 
tend to apply anti bid’ah movement as such which is more specific and 
try to avoid too much of practical and political nuanse in the first place 
although the implication to political realm is unavoidable. Thus, this 
paper will not apply organizational approach to the focus of discussion 
such as in the case of Noorhaidi Hasan.27 His research focuses 
particular attention to the Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Front of the 
Defenders of Islam), the Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI, Indonesia’s 
Party of Liberation), the Laskar Jihad (LJ, Jihad Paramilitary Force), 
the Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia (LMI, Indonesian Holy Warrior 
Force), and the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI). It does, however, assess further 
implication of what Noorhaidi found that ‘Islamist militants do not 
currently pose a significant threat to Indonesia’s security as many have 
shifted their strategy of violent jihad toward nonviolent Islamic 
missionary work in the grassroots in the form of “Islamization from 
                                                                 
25 S. Schwartz, The Two Faces of Islam: The House of Sa’ud from Tradition to Terror (New 
York: Doubleday, 2002), p. 74. 
26 A. Rashid, Taliban, Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2000). 
27 N. Hasan, “Transnational Islam in Indonesia,” in N. P. Report, Transnational Islam in 
South and Southeast Asia: Movements, Networks, and Conflict Dynamics (NBA Project Report, 
2009), pp. 121-140. 
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below’.28 When NU ulama or scholars explicitly proclaim that they 
have left NU or the ways of NU interpretation and practice of Islam 
(as will be detailed later), it has to be regarded as a significant threat to 
religious harmony and tolerance if this proclamation took place in a 
mosque affiliated to NU or traditional Islam in general. This is what 
this paper intends to argue partly in the next section. 
After a long time period, Indonesia has been regarded as a model 
of tolerant country for the rest of Muslim world, such as Islam, the 
ideology of tolerance where Remage refers to NU and its leader 
Abdurrahman Wahid as a model of religious tolerance in the country.29 
Toward the end of 2010 until the first half of 2012, however, 
Indonesians have witnessed many cases of intolerant acts toward 
minority groups in Indonesia. This was proven by a number of surveys 
conducted by highly reliable institutions of surveys, such as LSI 
(Indonesian Survey Institute) and CSIS (Center for Strategic and 
International Studies) as well as the Wahid Institute. The Wahid 
Institute, for example, reports that the cases of intolerance in 
Indonesia in 2012 rise by 30 percent and most cases are rooted in 
religious issues. Cases that were covered by such surveys were the 
burning of churches in a number of places, Ahmadiyah cases in West 
Java, Shi’a case in Sampang and some others which concerned 
minority groups.  
In the context of Islamic studies in Indonesia, anti bid’ah 
propagation entered the country in the first decade of the 20th century 
which was marked by the establishment of Muhammadiyah as the 
biggest organization. It was, however, later regarded as modernist 
movement. Other organizations such as the Islamic Union (Persis) and 
other smaller organizations that came later with similar characters, 
such as Shiratal Mustaqim in South Sulawesi that were not so appealing 
to be followed by Indonesian Muslims. Until the last decade of the 
New Order government, the anti bid’ah still used Muhammadiyah as 
the biggest umbrella organizationally. But since the fall of the Soeharto 
regime, better known as the Reform Era, anti bid’ah movement of 
those who are not members of Muhammadiyah had no longer used the 
organization as the tent organization. This is particularly due to the 
                                                                 
28 Ibid. 
29 D. E. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance (New 
York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 25-46. 
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discontent against Muhammadiyah performance in eradicating what 
were considered as bid’ah and more tolerant toward Muslims who are 
regarded practicing bid’ah. I argue that the present anti bid’ah 
movement can no longer be fully associated with Muhammadiyah. 
Therefore, I propose a new name for the movement that does not 
have the name organizationally, that is Neo-anti Bid’ah. Neo-anti bid’ah 
can be defined as the revival of anti bid’ah movement that was once 
rampant in Indonesia until the early 1980s with Muhammadiyah as the 
main umbrella organizationally. But two decades after the 1980s until 
the early 2000s, this movement experienced ups and downs, especially 
because this movement raised tension among Muslims. As a result, the 
anti bid’ah movement that was once widespread then declined and later 
incarnated in the form of rejuvenation with similarities and differences 
between the previous and the present. Eradicating bid’ah has no longer 
the main activities of Muhammadiyah or at least the old way of 
purifying Indonesian Muslims from bid’ah is no more prefered. 
Furthermore, the anti bid’ah with the jargon of anti TBC (Tahayul 
Bid’ah Churafat, superstition, innovation and heresy) after encountering 
resistance and challenges from traditional Islam and moderate 
intellectuals within the body of Muhammadiyah, famously bearers of 
cultural missionary movement, they generally broadcast and propagate 
through mosques, educational institutions, study groups which they 
built by themselves. At that time, this movement can be considered as 
an ideological movement that was broadcast through various wings of 
this organization. While the Neo-anti Bid’ah movement is not an 
umbrella organization itself nor affiliated to Muhammadiyah. Another 
difference, they use the traditionalist Islamic mosques which are mostly 
affiliated to Nahdlatul Ulama. They went into educational institutions 
and traditional Islamic teaching and for the time being there has been 
no institution they built by themselves.  
Mosque as Islamic Public Space: Beyond Ritualistic Function  
By applying Jurgen Habermas theory of public sphere, particularly 
concerning norms and modes of behavior that should prevail in public 
sphere, (a) general accessibility, (b) elimination of all privileges and (c) 
discovery of general norms and rational legitimations,30 what I mean by 
Islamic public space is the place where every Muslim should be 
                                                                 
30 Jurgen Habermas, “The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article,” New Germany 
Critique, No. 3 (Autumn, 1974), Footnote number 3, p. 50. 
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guaranteed to have free access whithout any disturbance by any other 
group of Muslims, be they belong to the same school of thought in the 
mosques or not. There should be no group who believe to having 
particular privileges that they are the only “correct” Islam and thus 
having the right to drive other Muslims off particular mosques. Should 
there be general norms to be promoted, they should be based on 
rational ligitimations not by a belief or a particular interpretation while 
different interpretations are also possible. This also should be 
discussed in appropriate time and place. 
Mosque, according to al-Sadiq al-Nayhum, was the premier public 
space in the Islamic world, which had similar function as the agora in 
the ancient Greek city and the public square in the medieval Western 
city.31 In addition to a place for performing Islamic regular prayers, 
Muslims make use of mosques as place of gatherings to discuss 
religious and social matters. Therefore, mosque has become important 
symbols for every Muslim.32 However, due to different understandings 
and practices of Islam for different groups of Muslims, mosque has 
also become a contested public sphere.33 In a way, when someone 
thinks that he or she has more knowledge than the others, he or she 
has the right to exclude the others from certain mosques. According 
Turner, “exclusion is now seen to be a matter of natural talents which 
some people develop and others do not” … “successful people are 
incessantly on the move, while the unsuccessful that are seen to have 
squandered their talents are characterised by their social and spatial 
fixity”.34 This is called ‘the connexionist world’.  
This is a picture of mosque role since the life of the Prophet 
Muhammad up to the contemporary Muslims world. For many Muslim 
countries in the world today, where there are particular buildings to 
have gatherings, the most common place to gather and to socialize is 
still mosque, because Muslims meet in mosques regularly every day, 
seven days a week (and at least) in every four hours a day in the 
                                                                 
31 N. Rabbat, “The Arab Revolution Takes Back the Public Space,” Critical Inquiry, 39, 
1 (2012): pp. 198-208. 
32 B. Metcalf, Making Muslim Space in North America and Europe (Berkeley, Los Angeles 
and London: University of California Press, 1996); D. Joly, Britannia’s Crescent 
(Aldershot: Avebury, 1995). 
33 B.S. Turner, “Managing Religions: State Responses to Religious Diversity,” 
Contemporary Islam, 1 (2007), pp. 123-137. 
34 Ibid., pp. 129. 
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average. The most attended gatherings are Friday congregation which 
is organized once a week. This is in addition to other social and 
cultural activities which are linked to Islamic teachings and which are 
initiated from ritual activities held in mosques. The only differences 
across the Muslim world are the expansion to variety of issues beyond 
religion to be discussed, the quality and quantity of gatherings, and of 
what age who usually use mosque for gatherings.35 
In a sense my study on the response of Jambi Malay Muslims 
toward anti bid’ah movement is similar to McLoughlin who asserts that 
conflicts over the Islamisation of public space often reveals majority 
fears about the erosion of a ‘British way of life’, which is similar to 
Jambi Malay Muslims as the majority in this study.36 However, 
McLoughlin study focuses more on problems faced by non-Muslims 
majority, thus between people inside a mosque and those who are 
outside, while my paper focuses on a group of Muslims as a majority in 
encountering their own fellow Muslims from minority.  
There are a number of characteristics that should always be 
considered in order to make it democratically plausible or acceptable 
public space. The most important thing is there should always be 
awareness of those who perform prayers in every mosque that there 
should no argument or physical fight among prayer participants, 
particularly whenever a prayer is about to start. Even an imam (a prayer 
leader) cannot impose a particular interpretation of Islam while a 
prayer is about to start. If an imam wants to teach particular 
understanding, particularly which is different or against the usual ways 
performed in a mosque, he should do it during teaching time in school 
or a discussions in a mosque but not when a prayer is about to start or 
soon after prayers have been done. These two points of time are the 
moment when Muslims are concentrating their mind to their God 
which should be free from interference for whatever reason.  
                                                                 
35 See S. McLoughlin, “The Mosque-centre, Community-mosque: Multi-functions, 
Funding and the Reconstruction of Islam in Bradford,” Scottish Journal of Religious 
Studies, 19, 2 (1998): pp. 211-227; M.T. Rasdi, The Mosque as a Community Development 
Centre: Programme and Architectural Design Guidelines for Contemporary Muslim Societies 
(Skudai, Johor Darul Ta'zim: Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, 1998); R.A. Chaudhri, 
Mosque: Its Importance in the Life of a Muslim (London: The London Mosque, 1982); A.I. 
Kahera, Deconstructing the American Mosque: Space, Gender, and Aesthetics (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2002). 
36 McLoughlin, “The Mosque-centre, Community-mosque”, p. 1046. 
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It should be noticed that there are two possibilities when an 
Islamic public space becomes private or semi-private.37 As cases in 
many Muslim countries in the world where there are mosques or other 
places for performing prayers that are built by particular organizations 
or family, such Islamic public place would become private or semi 
private. Muslim can join in and perform their prayers but they could 
not discuss other social and cultural issues without having permission 
from the owner. First, in Indonesia, there are mosques that are built by 
Muhammadiyah from Jakarta down to villages. This kind of mosque, 
although it has never been stated so, is private because other group of 
Muslims cannot have access to organize their social and cultural 
activities as they do on their own. Second, similar case also applied to 
langgar or mushalla which are built by rich or big families in certain 
urban areas. There are possibility that Muslim from outside the owner 
family could still make use such mosque but with prior permission 
from the owner. Of course there is no written regulation, but 
Indonesian Muslims just do it that way for the sake of toleration. This 
kind of mosque can hardly be categorized as public space in the same 
way mentioned above, they are private or semi-private.  
Why should Islamic public space matter? In the last few years, 
especially after the introduction of direct regional election in 
Indonesia, politicians have made use of any media in order to get 
support from voters, including mosque. For those who have already 
had connections with their Muslim fellows, they keenly use places of 
worships to introduce their intentiton to compete for particular 
regional election. In addtion, this is particularly applicable for 
politicians who officially affiliate to political parties that state 
promoting Islamic values. Therefore, for Muslims to have healthy 
democratic society, Islamic public space, such as mosque, should 
always be openly assessed.  
Conclusion 
This study has shown that mosques in Jambi Malay Muslim 
communities have become contested place of two difference ways of 
practicing Islamic teachings. This contestation has created potentials of 
internal religious conflicts among Muslims. One way is considered by 
certain group as bid’ah per se and thus should be avoided while the 
                                                                 
37 J. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category 
of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 1989). 
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other group considers it as bid’ah hasanah that can be conducted. 
Taking into consideration that there have been a number of moderate 
followers of Islam (such as of traditionalist Islam or NU) who have got 
rid off their own mosques which they have accupied since the 
foundation of the certain mosques, this is not minority being insecure 
aganist the presence of neo-anti bid’ah movement. It is, however, 
insecurity of the majority. Further, it can be argued that there are also a 
connotation between and “correct Islam” vs. “incorrect Islam”. This 
might in turn have implication back to political Islam though it might 
not be directly seen. However, looking at the general narrative of this 
paper, the neo-anti bid’ah movement in Jambi Malay Muslims does not 
seem to have any connection with ‘Arab Spring’ both in its relations to 
Wahabism or Salafism from political perspective. 
The final implication I want to draw concerns the choice of 
moderate traditionalist Muslims against the radical promotion of neo-
anti bid’ah, particularly the ‘humble’ choice of leaving their own 
mosques for the sake of harmonious life and avoiding arguments or 
conflicts. This is to say that religious piety can be maintained with a 
cost of reducing one’s ego for the sake of social harmony. In other 
words, there will be reduction of the role of the mosque as a public 
space because it had become a forced private space. This certainly is 
not good for a healthy democratic society. A maturity in managing 
Islamic public space in which social harmonious life can be maintained 
is highly in demand. 
In addition, for the future trajectory of being a democratic society, 
however, the harmonious life outside the mosques is actually hiding a 
time bomb which might explode in the future when those who have 
left their mosques want to go back to their mosques. Pretending 
harmonius life is in fact not a good strategy for a healthy democratic 
society for a long term. What Muslims need is mutual recognition with 
justification.38 Every group of Muslims can make use of mosque for 
both religious and social matters so long as disagreement can be solved 
with appropriate time and place. 
There is nothing wrong to consider Indonesian Muslims as 
tolerant country when it deals with other minority groups in the 
country. However, the silence of the majority (significant number of 
Muslims) where there are small groups of them acted intolerantly 
                                                                 
38 D. Rasmussen, “Mutual Recognition: No Justification without Legitimation,” 
Philosophy Social Criticism, 38 (2012), pp. 893-899. 
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toward them might be of high value to be taken into consideration 
when one wants to see the whole picture of contemporary Indonesia 
as a tolerant country.[] 
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